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Introduction 
The forces of globalization shape not only international relations and global 
commodity chains, but also influence local culture and social issues that historically have 
been seen as exclusively local problems, such as street gangs. The emergence of highly 
violent and prolific cliques of Central American street gangs (a.k.a. "maras") throughout 
the United States, Mexico and Central America, thus serves as a paradigmatic example of 
how the forces of globalization shape seemingly local concerns. 
Through the global cultural flows ofmedia and the transnational movement of 
people, these Central American maras2 evolved to their current levels through a series of 
initial adaptations, first to the Los Angeles gang scene in the 1980s and 90s, and later to 
post-conflict Central America. The development of these gangs was expedited by short­
sighted deportation policies of the United States Congress in 1996 and heavy-handed 
anti-gang initiatives in Central America starting in 2002. 
Furthermore, the rise of Central American gangs such as Maras Salvatrucha (MS­
13) and the 18th Street Gang (M-18), demonstrates the limitations of the nation-state in a 
globalized world. Given their transnational, dispersed and flexible nature, the maras are 
able to move across national borders and adapt to any suppression-centered anti-gang 
initiatives domestic governments may implement. This case study exemplifies the need 
for regional and international cooperation when addressing problems such as 
transnational crime, structural poverty, and even terrorism. 
This study is not intended to produce experimental or even quasi-experimental 
findings regarding the growth of Central American gangs. Nor is it intended to serve as 
an examination of every type of gang or make broad generalizations about all youth 
gangs. The focus of this paper is beyond a critique of U.S. immigration law and the 
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regions' judicial systems, although their roles as they relate to gang activities in these 
areas will be assessed. Nor is this paper a comprehensive ethnographic account of gang 
life and gang structure in general. Instead the purpose of this study is to synthesize the 
theoretical literature of globalization and apply it to what we know about specific gangs 
such as MS-13 and M-18 in North and Central America. 
More than anything else, the rise and evolution of the maras serves as an example 
of how cultural flows, and the exchange of global ideas, behavior and concepts, as 
expressed and transmitted through popular media, youth trends and migration, can shape 
the nature of seemingly hyper-local and domestic problems. As such, this case study 
adds to our understanding of the forces of globalization. 
Literature Review 
There is very little scholarly work regarding the recent intersection between the 
general concepts of globalization and the evolution of Central American gangs such as 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). This paper will build upon a large body of conceptual work 
on globalization as well as articles chronicling the growing problem of Central American 
gangs in particular, policy papers regarding how governments have responded to gang 
activity, and recent descriptions of gang structure, methods and behaviors. 
Over the past twenty years, many publications have been written to explain 
aspects of globalization. The topic is so broad that there is much debate over the very 
meaning and nature of globalization. One of the most important aspects to the 
framework used for this paper is the understanding of cultural flows and identity. Arjun 
Appadurai's "Modernity at Large" details his notion of the "imagination" and the 
existence of the "-scapes.,,3 The suffix "scapes" implies the ephemeral and irregular 
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shapes ofthese dimensions of cultural flow and that their depiction is based upon 
personal perception.4 Mike Featherstone's book Undoing Culture, discusses 
globalization with reference to the uncoupling of cultural goods from specific 
geographical locations, how local cultures are globalized, and what transformations take 
place in different contexts. In Transnational Conflicts, William I. Robinson focuses on 
globalization's effects on Central America, in particular the impact ofpost-industrialism 
on the region with its increase in social and class tensions, and the transnationalization of 
what were once internal problems. For an examination ofthe importance ofthe global 
media, "The New Spaces of Global Media" by Kevin Robins is useful. This piece 
manages to explain the emergence of a truly global media and what that means for 
culture and politics around the world. To a similar degree David Harvey in "Time-Space 
Compression and the Postmodern Condition," provides a framework for understanding 
recent changes as a result of technology and other advances. Harvey describes a world 
compressed, where goods, people and information flow rapidly across borders and 
discusses the potentially unbalancing effects this has caused. The concepts within these 
writings along with several other concepts will form the foundation of a theoretical 
framework to better understand the rise and evolution of gangs such as MS-13 and M-18. 
Gangs such as MS-13 and M-18 have only begun to be formally researched and 
up to now most of the information on them comes from journalists and law enforcement 
officials. One of the larger groups that has focused on the gangs is the human rights 
NGO, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Most recently WOLA held a 
conference in San Salvador, EI Salvador in October of2007. WOLA released a special 
report "Youth Gangs in Central America", where issues of human rights, effective 
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policing and gang prevention are discussed. The report, while primarily a policy paper, 
also examined different perspectives about youth gangs, different government approaches 
towards them and the consequences of these policies. Ana Arana's 2005 article in 
Foreign Affairs, "How the Street Gangs Took Central America" is a sweeping overview 
of the current gang situation (Maras) in Central America, as the author notes how anti­
gang measures and deportations by the U.S. government fueled the rise of the Central 
American gangs. Also in 2005, Clare Ribando wrote a brief titled "Gangs in Central 
America," for the U.S. Congressional Research Service, which provides a concise 
overview of the origins, contributing factors and national/regional responses to the gang 
crisis. An interesting article by Andrew Papachristos at the University of Chicago, 
"Gang World," serves as a reminder to the intrinsically hyper-local nature of street gangs. 
While globalization is a large factor in the development of certain non-traditional gangs 
such as MS-13, the fact remains that for the average gang member, globalization is just 
an insignificant word, as one's everyday life rarely extends beyond a three city block 
area. There have also been a series of congressional hearings held with experts from the 
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Justice 
and State Department testifYing during these hearings. As mentioned earlier, many of the 
best insights into the gang crisis have come from journalists. Some news articles, such as 
Fen Montaigne's piece in "Mother Jones," "Deporting America's Gang Culture," provide 
in-depth insights into aspects of Central American gangs and their rise. 
There is also a great deal of sociological work about gangs. Two texts important 
to this paper are The Modern Gang Reader 3rd Ed and Gangs in the Global City edited by 
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John Hagedorn. Gangs in the Global City, while focused more on European and 
American gangs, provides an interesting framework for understanding the pliability of 
gang culture in a wide range of national and social contexts worldwide. Culture in this 
sense can be defined as the "totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, 
beliefs, institutions, and all other products ofhuman work and thought."s 
Globalization Framework 
Although difficult, controversial, complex and perhaps contradictory, 
globalization can be defined as the broad development of global connections in a way 
that gives local events a potential global impact and vice versa. This works as a broad 
definition but when examining globalization processes and their effects, more detail must 
be developed. One way around the problem of the often contradictory nature of 
globalization is to accept that globalization itself should be understood and defined in the 
plural, as a group of inter-connected yet separate processes. This way, a definition that 
accounts for economic, political, social, and cultural processes can be developed. In 
economics, globalization is generally seen as economic internationalization with the 
spread of market capitalism, global financing, production and consumption. Political 
globalization is generally understood as the widening of interstate relations and global 
politics. Socially, it can be seen as the increased movement of people and groups around 
the world and their integration into a global society. These different layers of 
understanding globalization cannot be separated and understood piece-meal but rather 
they give social scientists a framework upon which to better understand and examine the 
increasingly ephemeral state of the world. 
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When it comes to global cultural flows, there are two general schools of thought. 
The first and traditionally most popular concept is that cultural globalization means the 
homogenization or "Americanization" of cultures around the world.6 In this theory, the 
"West," and the United States in particular is the core and export center ofa "global 
culture." A continuance of colonial theory, global cultural homogenization is seen as 
fostering cultural imperialism by the west over indigenous cultures in periphery states, 
particularly developing or non-Anglophone societies. Although the process historically 
started with 18th Century colonialism, since the 1960s American and European multi­
national corporations have been the primary drivers of cultural homogenization. Some 
believe that this framework for understanding cultural flows emanates from the very 
"logic of globalization" and capitalism on a global scale, imposing standardization and 
homogenization across global cultures.7 A fundamental flaw in the concept of global 
culture homogenization is that as cultural ideas and practices, and even many products 
and services enter new foreign societies they are "indigenized" to adapt to local contexts 
and become more applicable or marketable to the indigenous population.8 
The classic example used by theorists is the global expansion and influence of 
McDonalds restaurants, conceptualized by sociologists as "McDonaldization.,,9 
McDonaldization is a variation of cultural imperialism as the idea that McDonald's 
efficient management, standard menu and global marketability allow it to permeate 
cultures worldwide. The reality however is different. McDonalds as a business necessity 
invariably adapts its business, product and marketing plans to the local market. This 
means that McDonald restaurants in Des Plaines, Illinois, St. Petersburg, Russia, and 
Quetzaltenango, Guatemala will all have distinctive differences between their relative 
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prices, menu options, targeted market and operating practices. Some things will remain 
the same of course, such as the existence of the "Golden Arches," the availability of 
ketchup, and the use of the food assembly line, but these "American" innovations will be 
mixed with local preferences and product tastes. 10 In fact, even the very identity of this 
brand-focused restaurant varies internationally. What is an inexpensive fast-food option 
in the U.S. is marketed as a higher-end dining experience in locales such as Russia and 
Guatemala. This reality makes simple business sense not just for service industries like 
McDonalds but for any international business that spans nation-states or cultures. To be 
accepted under different contexts, products, brands and services must be localized. This 
is called "glocalization," a phrase coined by late Sony chairman Akio Marito. 
Glocalization is fundamentally understood as global localization, adapting global 
products, services or ideas for a local market. II This concept of glocalization can also be 
applied to cultural ideas or practices that are transmitted between cultures. 
The second school ofthought, and the one that will be used in this paper, is 
generally understood as the mixing or "hybridization" of global cultural flOWS. 12 The 
core of this theory is that as cultural ideas flow between territories, they are constantly 
evolving and becoming indigenized by local contexts and mindsets to better fit the 
existing society. 13 This implies that cultural flows are not a post-modem expansion of 
neo-imperialism by Western societies imposing cultural norms, but rather that cultural 
flows go in all directions and this exchange of cultural ideas and practices affects all 
societies, resulting in the creation of a diverse and dynamic global culture. This process 
is not a recent development by any means; historically it has existed for all ofhuman 
history. As long as different groups have come in contact, they have adopted, adapted 
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and exported culture between each other. This process first accelerated during 
colonialism; it is why India is an Anglophone country with an established bureaucratic 
democracy, why the Spanish language has incorporated Moorish!Arabic phrases, why 
most Mexicans practice Catholicism, and why it is possible to eat authentic Indian and 
Nigerian food in London. The examples ofmeshing cultures are endless. What has 
changed is the means and speed by which people and cultures interact and exchange 
cultural ideas and practices. 
This hyper-acceleration is possible through the literal and metaphorical 
compression of time and space in the modern world. In brief, spatial barriers and time 
constraints have been dismantled as information and transportation technologies have 
developed, allowing for an exponentially faster movement ofpeople, goods, ideas and 
capital than ever before. 14 Greater access to all regions of the world has actually 
emphasized the importance of local differences and variation. Rather than being wiped 
out by western homogenization, these small local differences have actually assumed 
greater importance as the hyper-mobile forces of capital, products and worker flows are 
drawn to the areas where they have the greatest competitive edge. Fashion, business and 
production practices, capital flows, ideologies, cultural ideas and even products are now 
progressively more volatile and ephemeral by nature. IS The only constant appears to be 
change, not always large or revolutionary change, but small adaptations and flows. This 
compression ofboth space and time, both real and perceived, has allowed the historical 
process of cultural hybridization and evolution to take on a new scale and develop faster 
than ever before. Obvious technologies like the internet, cell phones, mass market 
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television and motion pictures allow for almost instant transfer of cultural ideas into a 
wide range of contexts under which they may/will be interpreted and adapted differently. 
One way to examine the flows of global culture is to break the process into 
different "scapes" or dimensions of global cultural flow. These scapes are the building 
blocks for understanding the imagined worlds by which people identify themselves as 
their culture and upon which they build communities with others. 16 The use of the term 
"imagined worlds" is not meant to cheapen the cultural ideas and practices or social 
constructs, but rather to emphasize that they are adaptable mechanisms of the mind and 
not entirely dependent upon outside factors or day to day situations. 
Arjun Appadurai breaks the dimensions of global cultural flow into five scapes: 
ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes. These first three 
dimensions are the rather complex infrastructure and foundation upon which the other 
two scapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes, are built. 17 The two most important "scapes" for 
examining the evolution of Central American gangs are Ethnoscapes and Mediascapes. 
Ethnoscapes consist ofmoving groups ofpeople throughout the world. This includes 
tourists, refugees, emigrants, immigrants, guest workers, exiles and commercial workers 
moving between nations. The movement of these populations is spurred largely by their 
"fantasies" ofpotential change in different locations and also by how they deal with the 
realities they encounter. 19 Mediascapes are the most relevant dimensions for the 
theoretical framework of this paper. They include both the global distribution of 
information through public and private media channels (newspapers, television, movies, 
radio, the internet, etc.) as well as the very images these mediums transmit throughout the 
world. It is these images that people around the world encounter and interpret under 
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many different contexts. The key aspect to this process is the effect these "image­
centered, narrative-based accounts of scripts of reality" have on people's lives and how 
they interpret them.2o How a person interprets the cultural image depends upon many 
factors: the historical context ofthe society or country the person is in, one's own 
education and personal history, the medium upon which the image was delivered, the 
societal opinion of the message being portrayed and one's understanding of the original 
context in which the image was created. It is out of these interpretations of the elements 
(characters, plots and themes) ofthe transmitted cultural image that people can 
incorporate the developed cultural idea into their own imagined life and those of others.21 
It has become nearly impossible for a person's mental maps to keep up with the 
increasingly volatile and ephemeral realities of a globalized world which forces one to 
create imaginary worlds to try to interpret and deal with their ever-changing reality.22 
These imagined worlds can become directly influential in how people live and act in their 
everyday lives.23 This is not to imply that there is a mechanical shaping ofbehavior by 
media but rather that the images enhance the presence of cultural ideas and open up 
avenues of communication among different people and cultures. 
The commodification and transmission of cultural images of early-1990s Los 
Angeles gang culture to Central America is a perfect case study of global cultural flows 
and evolution. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, all forms ofthe media were 
interested in capturing and portraying images of Los Angeles gang culture at its peak. In 
particular, as the popularity of'gangsta' rap and hip hop music emerged, parts of the 
cultural meanings and ideas surrounding these emerging styles grew in popularity as 
well. The music was practically irresistible to adolescents who were attracted to its 
-'­
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forbidden, aggressive and counter-authority origins. Music videos broadcast on MTV, 
movies, and television shows portrayed a "gangsta paradise" with Los Angeles gang life 
being associated with big money, expensive cars, pretty girls and an edginess that 
appealed to many youths. Soon it was not just the Bloods or Crips or Homeboys from 
Los Angeles wearing baggy jeans, oversized t-shirts and plaid button ups, but teens 
throughout the country, including many in affluent suburban communities who also did 
so. Soon various commodified images and ideas of the gangsta' rap/hip hop culture 
incorporated themselves into many aspects of pop-culture, youth marketing, fashion and 
even everyday youth vernacular. The driving force behind these flows of cultural images 
and ideas around the country and the world was consumption, the selling of a lifestyle (or 
at least the commodified aspects of a lifestyle) that was intrinsically attractive to youths 
for its rebellious, unbridled and seemingly dangerous nature. 
One aspect of "Americanization" that is useful to mention in this case is the 
global reach of American culture and media, particularly pop culture. This includes the 
worldwide distribution of Hollywood films such as: Colors (1998), Boyz N the Hood 
(1991), Mi Vida Loca (1993), Blood In, Blood Out (1993), that while displaying the 
tragedy of gang life also glorified it and presented compelling narratives of life on the 
streets, through depicting tormented yet strong protagonists. The rap and hip hop music 
popular in the U.S. spread globally along with the image-rich MTV music videos further 
glamorizing and serving as a hook for LA gang culture. It is no wonder why such 
glamorized, colorful and dramatic portrayals of la vida loca24 would be so attractive to 
the disenfranchised youth of Central America. While a youth from Central America 
would have no way of understanding the true context of these marketing-driven, 
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glamorized images, they would instinctively integrate them into their own "imagined 
realities." The mean streets of Los Angeles would certainly not seem an extreme leap in 
imagination to kids growing up in the barrios of San Salvador, Tegucigalpa and 
Guatemala City with few economic opportunities available to them as they continued to 
live under the shadow of the civil wars. In their eyes, they could imagine themselves as 
"homeboys" living la vida loca, living largely by the way ofthe gun, the male dominated 
gang culture fitting nicely into concepts of "machismo" of Latin America. The images 
and ideas, in a sense, became internalized and incorporated into their "imagined worlds" 
where they could influence the very way the youth interpreted their world and acted. The 
spread of Los Angeles gang pop culture through bootleg gangsta rap CDs, sold on the 
street or in international blockbusters, served as a background and primer of sorts for the 
eventual arrival of the real thing, Central Americans from Los Angeles, who were 
deported for gang crimes in groups like Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gang. These 
deportees brought with them unprocessed and unrefined aspects of Los Angeles gang 
culture, untouched by the media conglomerates. Los Angeles gang culture includes a set 
of principles focused upon respect, solidarity and unwavering loyalty one's gang clique, 
insubordination to the law and to all institutions of authority, hyper-territoriality, visual 
expression through the use of fashion and tattoos, deference toward the gang clique 
hierarchy and above all the concept of street justice and its implicit violence. The first 
wave of deportees who arrived in a Central America, met counterparts in the despondent 
youths who were living in a society that could neither care, nor provide for them. The 
deportees were looked upon as demi-gods by their peers, straight from the youths' 
imagined perceptions of the glorified, hard streets of Los Angeles. 
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The Central American Context 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the people of Central America experienced several brutal 
civil wars. Guatemala was embroiled in a conflict (1960-1996) between many leftist 
guerilla groups and U.S. supported military dictatorships. EI Salvador's civil war (1980­
1992) was fought between the Salvadoran government and a loose coalition of leftist and 
communist forces under the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). In both 
conflicts the civilian populations bore the brunt of the violence and oppression. In 
Guatemala approximately 200,000 people were killed during the civil war, the majority 
ofwhom belonged to the large indigenous population.25 Approximately 75,000 
Salvadorans were killed in their civil war with another 8,000 missing, one million 
internally displaced, and another million refugees who were forced to leave, at the time 
EI Salvador had a population of approximately 5 million people,z6 The wars also left the 
region in economic tunnoil. The gross domestic product per capita in Guatemala was at 
$3,300 by the time the peace accord was signed in 1996,27 and when the fighting stopped 
in EI Salvador in 1992, the economy was wrecked. Meanwhile in Honduras, 
unemployment was mounting as the mechanization of commercial farms left many 
unskilled laborers without work. The ensuing wars and political instability discouraged 
any substantial foreign investment that would have created jobs for youth and even those 
who completed an education, had a hard time finding any work. Central America has 
continued to have among the highest levels of inequality in the world,28 and income 
inequality has been shown to be the strongest predictor ofhigh violent crime rates.29 
One of the immediate results of these political and economic crises was a sharp 
increase in the number of immigrants from EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
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Nicaragua to the United States. In the 1970s there were a total of 134,640 immigrants 
who came to the United States from Central America, including 34,436 Salvadorans. In 
the 1980s this number jumped to 468,088 immigrants, from all of Central America, 
213,539 coming from EI Salvador.3o Some ofthese immigrants were former rebel 
fighters or right-wing paramilitaries from the Salvadoran slums or the Guatemalan 
highlands. They brought a working knowledge of weapons, explosives and combat 
experience to their new homes in the United States. Some ofthese refugees became the 
founding members and parents of the generation that would start gangs such as Mara 
Salvatrucha in Los Angeles. 
While the military and police played a predominant role in perpetuating conflict 
during the civil wars, afterwards they were largely demobilized and restructured to 
prevent the abuses that had previously taken place from occurring in the future. This 
created relatively weak security institutions within Central America, but even so, the 
"restructured" police forces were still largely mistrusted by the population, as they 
continued to inflict abuses and widespread corruption.31 During the war in Guatemala 
extreme right-wing vigilante civilian "security forces" emerged to fight an 
unconventional war against the rebels. Their tactics included the use of torture, forced 
disappearance and the murder of suspected leftists and their families. In addition, many 
students, professionals and peasants were targeted. The groups were never completely 
disarmed or disbanded and with the dismantlement of formal repressive state security 
institutions, they would later apply their methods of violence and vigilante justice to new 
social problems.32 
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The region was also awash in small arms and other military-grade weapons left 
over from the civil wars. There are approximately 4 million weapons in Central America, 
at least 2 million of which are military-grade small arms. This means that in Central 
America there is one assault rifle for every ten people.33 This statistic alone does not 
predict trouble; the United States actually has more firearms than it does people. 
However, given the availability of cheap military-grade weapons, the existence of 
political instability, a history of government abuses and vigilante death squads and high 
levels of economic inequality and poverty, the statistic takes on greater significance. 
The situation for children in these countries has been particularly perilous. The 
circumstances within Guatemala as the civil war ended in 1996 are particularly 
demonstrative of trends throughout the entire region. In 1996, over 49.1 % of the 
Guatemalan population was under the age of fourteen. 34 Over 80% of the population 
lived under the poverty threshold, and ofthose 7 million people over 5.1 million lived in 
extreme poverty.35 The rate of child poverty was particularly high as the majority of 
large poor households were in rural areas. Honduras and El Salvador saw similar trends 
with nearly 50% of their population under the age of 18, struggling to overcome the 
drastic changes during the 1990s. In addition to their immediate circumstances, young 
people in Central America had very little to look forward to. In 1994, the literacy rate in 
Guatemala was only 60% and in rural areas as much as 70% ofthe population was 
illiterate.36 Only 43.3% of children over the age of fourteen were registered within the 
school system while statistics for corresponding attendance rates are unavailable.3? 
Throughout the region, young people were deprived of educational opportunity, excluded 
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from receiving the benefits of formal economic initiatives, and generally were ignored by 
government institutions. 
The children of the last three decades in Central America have lacked any kind 
of economic or social opportunities to integrate into society. 38 Youth unemployment 
levels, particularly among those from low income homes, have been remarkably high. 39 
Domestic violence was and is a common and tragic reality for many children. A 
university study in El Salvador showed that physical domestic violence was present in at 
least 80% ofhouseholds.4o As a result of the strains placed upon the family unit from 
wartime or economic troubles, the tragic prevalence of violence within the home with 
corresponding police indifference to its expression, and inter-familial consequences of 
"machismo," many children and youths were and continue to be subject to physical abuse 
or neglect. 4\ Under such circumstances it is understandable that many children become 
desensitized to violence and develop skewed understandings of its role in society.42 
As children of the civil wars, many youth were influenced to believe, through the 
death squads, rebel attacks and government oppression, that violence and vengeance are 
more viable options towards solving conflicts than faith in the rule oflaw or peaceful 
resolution.43 This is not a surprising development when the police and the government, 
the institutions responsible for providing fair justice and adherence to rule oflaw, act 
with impunity. 
These conditions created a cohort of Central American youth, unemployed, 
marginalized from society, accustomed to a world of violence and tragedy, lacking in 
paternal role models and with no apparent future. It was members among this cohort of 
the disenfranchised who would adopt U.S. gang culture. They found new idols and 
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surrogate family members as they began to associate with the strangely dressed, tattooed 
and violent men, who arrived in shackles from the u.s. but once in Central America, 
were free to recruit new proteges. To understand the impact these deportees would have 
upon Central America youth, it is essential to explain the circumstances under which they 
adapted to and developed gang life in Los Angeles. 
The Homeboys 
While many Central Americans lived through the struggles and tragedies of the 
civil wars, others sought to find refuge outside of the country. In fact, over 20% ofthe 
population ofEI Salvador fled during the twelve-year civil war, over 5 million people in 
tota1.44 In 1990 alone, 80,173 Salvadorans immigrated legally to the United States, many 
as special status war refugees.45 The majority of these immigrants settled in the Rampart 
area of Los Angeles in predominately Hispanic, Mexican/Chicano neighborhoods. Most 
of the families that escaped the violence brought children who, while born in Central 
America, would spend most of their childhood growing up on the streets of Los Angeles. 
At this point in time, Los Angeles became the nation's "capital" for street gangs as turf 
wars between the Bloods and Crips brought homicide and crime statistics to record highs 
and the media rushed in to capture the essence of this new gangster lifestyle. Upon 
arrival the new refugees were terrorized in their own neighborhoods by several 
established local Hispanic gangs.46 
In response to these threats several Salvadoran refugees started a protection group 
they called Mara Salvatrucha (MS-l3). The name comes from Salvadoran slang for a 
soldier ant, Mara, and a nickname for Salvadorans, Salvatruchas; members of the new 
gang referred to themselves as "Homeboys." In fact, an enigmatic street gang named La 
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Mara already existed in El Salvador during the civil war, although information on its 
history and nature are unclear as crime statistics from the time were skewed by the 
ongoing civil war and corrupt government. The gangs that existed during the end of the 
civil war in El Salvador were scattered groups, typically armed only with knives and 
machetes, with no real connection to illegal drugs and very little appeal or power.47 In 
contrast, the new gang culture that grew up in Los Angeles was more violent, better 
organized and exuded a certain style and way oflife that appealed to youth. Many 
believe that the first members ofMS-13 were actually former members ofLa Mara or 
guerrilla! right-wing paramilitary refugees, as this explains the level oforganization and 
violence for which the gang would become notorious.48 By the early-90s the images and 
some original values ofthe Los Angeles gang life had already been processed and 
mainstreamed by the national media as a cultural phenomenon, with movies and rap 
music sending images of drive-by shootings and turfwars, with kids around the country 
wearing baggy clothes and getting new stylistic tattoos.49 
While membership was originally limited to Salvadorans, Mara Salvatrucha was, 
along with the 18th Street gang, one ofthe first gangs to break the racial and nationalist 
barrier by accepting members from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras other Hispanics and 
even some African-Americans.5o This trans-national identity today is more prevalent 
within gang cliques in the United States. However, even in Central America there is an 
overriding sense that gang identity runs deeper than any nationalistic pretensions. While 
a gang like Mara Salvatrucha may employ nationalistic symbols such as the national flag 
and colors of El Salvador, these symbols have typically been adopted by the gang culture 
without retaining much oftheir original nationalistic meaning. For example, MS-13 gang 
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cliques in Guatemala will use Salvadoran national symbols in their body art or graffiti, 
even though when asked they would still identify themselves Guatemalans and may even 
be slightly prejudiced against Salvadorans. It is this kind of flexible nature, not only in 
recruiting but also in criminal activities and modus operandi, which allowed Mara 
Salvatrucha to expand and evolve to a truly transnational scale. 
Although originally formed for protection against other Los Angeles gangs, it was 
not long before MS-13 was fully integrated into the Los Angeles gang environment. 
Aside from the music, fashion and other more marketable characteristics, the emergence 
of the Los Angeles gang life brought with it new types of crimes to Central America. 
This was the gang scene that popularized the "gangland drive-by shooting" and perfected 
the art of using graffiti to mark territory. However, for the most part, Los Angeles gangs 
would participate in what is considered cafeteria-style crime, basically a wide-range of 
criminal endeavors, most of them not very serious and not specializing in anyone 
particular crime. For example, the average gang clique over the course of a month may 
engage in some simple muggings, petty theft, extortion, small scale drug dealing and 
possibly a drive-by shooting against rival gang members. Street gang involvement in 
drug distribution and dealing was a relatively new trend in the 1980s. As the U.S. 
economy was restructured with fewer job opportunities in poor urban areas, the informal 
economy in these areas (such as Los Angeles) expanded. Many street gangs transformed 
their character, taking on a more economically-driven model; drug dealing was the most 
profitable informal venture available. 51 Not all gangs became income-generating, 
however. In fact in 1995 a survey of police officers across the country estimated only 
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26% of gangs were income-generating, 28% were what they defined as violent gangs, 
and they considered 46% of gang cliques as simply delinquent groups. 52 
Gangs reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and size in Los Angeles 
between the 1970s and 90s. While gangs such as MS-13 and M-18 were fully part of the 
general Los Angeles gang scene, they also worked to distinguish themselves. Members 
ofMS-13 and M-18 developed an extensive and complex system of symbols and rituals. 
Many of these adopted symbols are expressed visually in the form of tattoos or gang 
signs using their hands. Gang signals are often used as warnings or for intimidation, 
stating that they "own" this particular area. Some gang cliques use a more elaborate 
system called "stacking," a type of sign language used to coordinate actions or advertise 
the clique to which they belong. 53 Often employing religious, Salvadoran nationalistic 
symbols, representations of the devil or evil (such as devil horns on the forehead or full 
depictions) and other forms of symbolism, many members would tattoo nearly their 
entire bodies. (See Appendix A.) The tattoos typically carry special meanings for the 
members who wear them, such as Los Angeles area codes or tributes to fallen gang 
members or one's family. Often times, these tattoos serve as visual biographies; others 
are particular to their local clique. Many of the particular gang styles and symbols 
utilized have been useful to law enforcement officials and gang researchers as they 
understand how the gang has migrated and changed. What were particularly unique to 
these Hispanic gangs were facial tattoos. The idea behind such unconventional body art 
was to send a message as to how serious, dedicated or crazy the individual was, in living 
the gang life, La vida Loca. Placing tattoos on one's hands or face is a way to permanently 
symbolize their rejection of general society and to assert their membership in the gang. 
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The widespread use of tattoos to denote lifelong membership with a gang was a more 
recent development with the growth of gangs in Los Angeles. The irony behind this use 
of unconcealed body art was that the very characteristics that set them apart, at least 
visually, from other gangs would eventually make gang members visible targets by the 
robust police initiatives and the vigilante violence of Central America in later years. 
The other gang that would eventually grow along with MS-13 was the 18th Street 
Gang. Originally formed in the 1960s, exclusively for U.S. residents of "pure" Hispanic 
background, M-18 saw tremendous growth as it expanded its membership criteria and 
accepted members from many neighborhoods and backgrounds M-18 grew largely 
through its strategy of "jumping in" (initiation into the gang through timed beatings) of 
"tagger crews," groups of youth that spray graffiti, and through its recruitment of new 
immigrants to Los Angeles 54 M-18 has even been credited as the first Hispanic street 
gang to "strategically" establish new cliques either through active recruitment or through 
the relocation of existing members. 55 Although evidence for these activities as part of a 
planned or centralized strategy is weak, there is evidence to support the belief that some 
cliques have actively recruited and migrated to new areas as the communities they 
depend upon expand or move.56 
In response to skyrocketing crime rates and the very existence of public gang 
wars, Los Angeles and Californian authorities responded with much stricter anti-gang 
laws in the mid 1990s. The laws used a variety ofmethods to target gangs and restrict, 
punish or prevent their activities. The new measures included charging young gang 
members as adults, applying stricter felony sentences to crimes associated with street 
gangs, and giving harsher penalties to multiple offenders under the "three strikes you're 
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out" law of 1994.57 The laws put thousands of LA gang members in prison, including 
hundreds ofHispanic members from groups such as MS-13 and M-18. 
A few years later, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. Within the act was a section expanding 
the list of crimes that made a non-citizen eligible for involuntary and immediate 
deportation back to one's country of origin.58 The law was criticized regarding its 
constitutionality and for its broad language regarding the range of offenses and persons 
eligible for deportation. However, despite legal and legislative challenges, the law 
survived and its implementation has expanded. The law resulted in an immediate jump in 
the number of annual deportations. In 1996,69,680 aliens were deported from the United 
States. Within one year that number had risen to 114,432 and by the year 2000 it was up 
to 186,391 deportations per year. 59 Since then, about 20-30% of the deportations have 
been on the basis of criminal violations, approximately 30-40,000 per year.60 The leading 
countries of origin for deportees have been Mexico (69%), Honduras (7%) and 
Guatemala (6%).6\ 
After serving their prison sentences in the United States, convicts selected for 
deportation would be placed in special detention centers awaiting a flight back to their 
country of origin, countries most had not been to since they were young children. They 
were heavily tattooed, their Spanish (if they spoke any at all) was interspersed with 
English and extensive slang and they wore the baggy pants, white t-shirts and oversized 
plaid button ups, all ofwhich were characteristics of the Los Angeles gang scene. 
Until 2007, 62 Central American governments had no way of even knowing the 
criminal backgrounds of the new arrivals as the U.S. immigration laws did not allow for 
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that kind ofinfonnation sharing.63 After serving their sentences in U.S. prisons, what 
many experts consider the equivalent of getting a masters degree in crime, the deportees 
arrived as unemployable outcasts. Their poor language skills, extensive tattoos 
particularly those on their faces, and their lack of any real education or practical work 
experience made them particularly unemployable in societies where there were already 
few jobs available.64 This lack of viable opportunities meant that even those who did 
want to start a new legitimate life had no chance to and were again driven to crime and 
the fringes of society. 
However, the same characteristics that caused the deportees to be perceived as 
outcasts by general society in Central America made their lifestyle so attractive to many 
Central American youths. Many young people of the region were well primed through 
MTV, Hollywood and hip-hop music to embrace these new icons of the ultra rebellious 
counter culture of gang life by the mid-l 990s.65 In idolizing transplanted gang members, 
many young Central Americans saw an opportunity to embrace another way oflife where 
unemployment and social exclusion wouldn't matter, a way of life that was already being 
glorified by the media worldwide. Therefore it is not difficult to see why the gangs grew 
so quickly first in EI Salvador and later in Honduras and Guatemala. The criminal 
deportees were representatives of the "gang banger life," and their presence, after youth 
were exposed to decades ofviolence, shattered families and inequality, brought about an 
explosion of crime, violence and fear. 
Central America in the 1990s was extremely vulnerable to the outbreak and 
radicalization of gang culture and violence. With media flows of glorified images of 
gang life and the physical flow of bona fide experienced gang members returning to their 
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countries of origin, introduced a new type of criminal to Central America representing the 
violent gang culture in Los Angeles. Unfortunately for the people of Central America, 
these trends could not have come at a worse or more inopportune time. Wars and 
economic crises had thrown the national economies into shambles and fragmented the 
family unit, government security institutions once oppressively strong were dismantled 
after the civil wars, guns were cheaper to buy than were many household goods, 
inequality rates were among the highest in the world and almost half ofthe regional 
population was under the age of fourteen. It was as a result of these exceptional 
circumstances that the consequences of the cultural and migration flows typical of 
globalization were so dramatically evident and destabilizing. 
However, as explained in the first section on globalization, cultural constructs 
such as gang culture do not remain unchanged when subject to different contexts and 
changing environments. The same factors that made Central American youth so 
vulnerable to the new gang culture, structural poverty, history ofviolence, and social and 
familial poverty, also transformed the culture itself. The nature and size of gangs is 
heavily influenced by how capable state security and social institutions are at limiting 
crime and other dangerous social behaviors such as drug use. In Central America the 
inability of the security institutions of the state to fully implement any sound policies has 
allowed the youth gangs to reach new levels ofviolence and crime. The failure ofthe 
economy and of social institutions provided an endless pool ofpotential recruits for gang 
expansion. 
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The Rise of Las Maras 
Within ten years of the arrival ofMS-13 and M-18 members into the region, the 
membership of the two gangs has grown to, by conservative estimates, approximately 
70,000-100,000 members, in Central America. In the United States the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI) estimates that today there are approximately 38,000 members of 
MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang.67 Estimates of gang membership vary greatly, 
particularly in Central America, as reporting bodies have varying definitions and methods 
of identifying and tabulating gang members. What is for certain is the explosive growth 
these gangs have experienced. 
Within the same time period, there has been an ominous spike in violent crime as 
gang membership levels have increased throughout the region. For instance, in 1999 the 
homicide rate in Honduras reached 154 murders per 100,000 people.68 This made 
Honduras one of the most violent countries in the world. In comparison, the United States 
at the same time had a murder rate of 5.7 per 100,000 and Colombia, a South American 
country undergoing a violent civil war, had 70 per 100,000. Since then, the homicide rate 
has dropped to 46 homicides per 100,000 people in 2004. Other countries in the region 
had similar homicide rates. In 2004, Guatemala had 34.7 homicides per 100,000 people 
and in EI Salvador 41.2 per 100,000.69 In 1998, EI Salvador had more than 6,000 
homicides, matching the country's annual death toll during the height of the civil war in 
1983.70 Casa Alianza, a child rights group, tabulated all media reports of killings of 
people 23 years old and younger in Honduras and reported 1,976 violent deaths and/or 
executions of youths between 2002 and 2006. 71 
Official crime statistics in the region are notoriously inaccurate, particularly when 
designating the nature ofthe crime. For instance, when distinguishing between domestic 
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violence, organized crime and gang-related crimes. El Salvador estimated that 60% of 
the 2,576 murders in 2004 were gang-related. Guatemala and Honduras attribute 
similarly high percentages to gang-related offenses. The problem with estimating how 
many of these crimes are gang related stems from a lack of information regarding crime 
statistics during the pre-Mara, civil war years. Some experts believe that the civil wars in 
the region concealed high non-related crime statistics and that it is only recently that the 
government has become serious about collecting crime statistics in order to justify and 
attempt to tabulate the effect ofnew law enforcement heavy response to gangs. 72 
Government sources and media reports often use gangs as scapegoats for all the 
security and criminal problems in the region.73 For example, Guatemala has seen a surge 
in murders of young women and girls with more than 665 murdered in 2006,53% of the 
murders were of girls between 10-11 years old. 74 In 2000, the number of murdered 
women was 213. 75 In 2006, authorities reported that over 90% of the victims suffered 
sexual abuse prior to their deaths. 76 While the vast majority of gang-related violence and 
murders are committed against men, the local governments and media have been 
attributing most of the violence against women to violent gang initiation rituals.77 
Nonetheless, just as crime statistics were manipulated and concealed during the decades 
of civil war, now the existence and activities of the maras have been used to explain the 
(perceived) rise in violence against women. Blaming the problem solely on gang violence 
suppresses any debate over the prevalence of domestic violence and murder, preventing 
any significant change or social action from taking place78 . Many human rights observers 
believe the same mechanism is at work disguising military and criminal organizations left 
over from the civil war that continue to profit through the drug trade, arms deals and 
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government corruption. For such groups, not only is the perception of widespread gang 
violence convenient so as to conceal their own crimes, but the social and economic 
instability and unrest caused by the gang-violence distracts the public from dealing with 
the structural social problems that exist and the more organized criminal elements left 
over from the wars.79 The maras were changed not only by arriving in a different context 
that allowed them to grow and act with more freedom than before, but also by the 
responses the Central American governments and people had to their presence. 
During the civil wars in Central America shadowy paramilitary, right-wing 
vigilante groups emerged applying brutally violent and extralegal methods labeled as 
"social cleansing" towards the struggle against those labeled as revolutionaries. Several 
of these groups, thought dissolved, have reappeared with the rise of the maras, and one 
such group is the infamous Sombra Negra in El Salvador. So-called "death squads" like 
the Sombra Negra were allegedly responsible for thousands of disappearances and 
murders of civilians they labeled as troublemakers or revolutionaries between the 1980s 
and 90s.80 The groups are largely comprised of police and military personnel who use the 
organizations to act with impunity. Similar groups also existed in Guatemala and after the 
peace accords in both countries did very little to disarm or demobilize these shadow 
militias and security forces. 
In April of 1995 Sombra Negra took credit for the murders of seventeen people 
who were allegedly gang members. Most ofthe victims had been blindfolded and bound 
before receiving Tiros de Gracia, gunshots to the base of the skull at point blank range 
with an automatic or assault weapon. Following the killings, sixteen alleged members of 
Sombra Negra were arrested for the killings, including four high ranking national police 
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officers, Policia Nacional Civil (PNC). All sixteen suspects were eventually released and 
no one was ever convicted for the crimes. La Sombra Negra justified the extrajudicial 
executions by declaring that "the laws of the country are not working" and that "the PNC 
does not have sufficient resources to combat crime.,,81 While Sombra Negra has not 
made any more statements and the group has allegedly disbanded, the killings have not 
stopped. In fact, throughout the region, the number of unexplained murders has 
increased, many ofwhich bear the signs of social cleansing, using violence, torture, and 
murder to address "social problems.,,82 
Violence committed by these vigilante groups was often ignored as a "necessary 
evil" by both the public and the police to counter the maras terrorizing their communities. 
However, the extrajudicial killings have since expanded so as to include many victims 
targeted for being "young and poor" without possessing even a single tattoo.83 Many are 
being killed in certain neighborhoods solely on the possibility that they are associated 
with a gang or will be in the future. Combined with the gang-violence, this vigilante 
"justice" has contributed to the overall regional instability and is both a symptom and a 
cause of ineffective government institutions. 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras were in a state of fragile transition to 
democracy and rule oflaw in the 1990s when they were forced to deal with the rapid 
growth of the maras. A vital aspect to this transition is the demilitarization ofthe state 
and the reform of the police and security institutions. When faced with the threat of 
emerging street gangs, El Salvador and Honduras decided on heavy "militarized" 
enforcement as a solution.84 
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Both countries instituted Mana Dura, or Strong Hand, policies. This strategy 
views street gangs as a law enforcement problem to be solved with more security, police 
and prisons. There are three different pillars of any successful anti-gang initiative: 
Suppression, Intervention and Prevention.8s The Mana Dura policies focus on the 
suppression side of anti-gang initiatives and view gang members not as victims or 
products of social and economic problems but rather as intrinsically criminal elements 
that need to be removed from society. So far El Salvador and Honduras have yet to 
develop long-term approaches implementing the other two pillars. The Mana Dura laws 
made association with a gang a crime by itself. For simply associating with a gang, a 
person can get an automatic prison sentence ofup to twelve years, regardless of whether 
or not one has committed any other "traditional crime.,,86 Honduras implemented the 
changes in 2002 and there was an almost immediate impact and soon afterwards El 
Salvador adopted its own program. On paper at least, the program initially appeared to 
be extremely effective. Prison systems swelled with the new arrivals, and within a year, 
Honduras' prison system was 200% over capacity. £1 Salvador experienced similar 
problems as both countries' legal systems, already strained, struggled to keep up with the 
overwhelming numbers of new criminal charges. As a result, appropriate jurisprudence 
and thorough investigation were severely lacking. Human rights groups criticized the 
hard-line approach as an attempt to "arrest itself' out of its gang problem without 
addressing its underlying social causes.8? The Mana Dura laws also have led to a general 
disregard for the rules ofjurisprudence and proper investigation standards, as arrests are 
made under vague rules. For example, in the first year of the Mana Dura laws in £1 
Salvador, 19,275 people were detained under the new laws for association with a gang, 
32 
and nearly 91 % of those arrested were later released without being charged, due to lack 
of evidence.88 (See Appendix C.) 
The prison systems have been completely overwhelmed. All three countries have 
gone as far as designating certain prisons for specific gang members only to attempt to 
cut down on inter-gang violence and control the prisoners. There has also been a high 
incidence ofprison fires, particularly in Honduras and Guatemala as a result of 
overcrowding, and possibly as a form of extra-judicial killing of gang members. For 
example, there are accusations that in May 2004, Honduran prison guards allowed a fire 
to bum for sixty to ninety minutes before responding, killing 106 MS-13 members. 89 The 
enormous influx of gang members into the prison system has made prison time 
practically a rite of passage for young and aspiring gang members. The prisons are 
described as 'colleges for criminals' or gang finishing schools.90 Gang members who get 
picked up on the street for wearing baggy pants or having arm tattoos serve time with 
hardened criminals and gang members from all over. They share information, network 
with each other and learn. More than anything else, the prisons have made the gangs 
more cohesive, giving them an environment to make connections and plans.91 This 
theory was reinforced in 2002 when crime statistics shot up again after the first wave of 
gang members who had been arrested in the early 90s was released.92 
The maras themselves would have the most volatile and calculated response to the 
new anti-gang strategy and their behaviors would eventually highlight its weaknesses. 
The maras retaliated with waves of random violence intending to send a message to the 
government. On December 23,2004, a group ofMS-13 members stopped a random bus 
on a Honduran highway, they then surrounded the bus and opened up firing assault 
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weapons, killing twenty-eight people including six children, and seriously wounding 
fourteen others. The gang members left a large note on the front of the bus addressed to 
the president of Honduras. The note identified MS-13 as the perpetrators of the attack 
and said it was in retaliation for the Mana Dura, zero-tolerance policies.93 
Adaptation and Evolution 
The implementation of the heavy-handed Mana Dura laws and the re-emergence 
ofbrutal vigilante groups were the causes of the third major transformation of the Central 
American maras. The first change occurred during the creation and integration ofCentral 
American gangs into the Los Angeles gang scene in the 1980s. The second was when the 
maras and their distinctive Los Angeles gang culture arrived in Central America, where 
they grew to unprecedented levels and acted with impunity under the jurisdiction of weak 
state institutions. While the mara culture from Los Angeles had taken on Central 
American characteristics present within the immigrant communities of Los Angeles. The 
arriving had to find a way to reassert their identity and adapt to their new surroundings. 
The third transformation thus involved a series of behavioral adaptations in response to 
the gangs' changing environment, as they confronted vigilante death squads and the 
mana dura government policies. 
The targeting of gang members through their use of elaborate tattoos provides an 
interesting example ofhow the maras have adapted to their changing environment. 
Previously, extensive body and facial tattoos had served as a means of visual expression, 
through which among members advertised their dedication to gang life and created an 
exotic/dangerous allure so as to attract new recruits. However, with the implementation 
ofthe Mana Dura laws, police and military forces were able to specifically target gang 
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members according to this particular cultural practice. The tattoos were (and in many 
places still are) an integral part of the general mara/gang culture. Therefore, just as they 
changed other cultural beliefs and practices to suit their environment, the pandillas 
(Central American gang members) adapted their extensive tattooing practices to new 
crackdowns in Central America. The fluidity and speed with which the maras made such 
adaptations is remarkable, and is further evidence of the flexible nature of mara/gang 
culture and its adherents. Thus, as soon as the Mano Dura crackdowns started, new gang 
members began to shun tattoos while older members took lower profiles or went to great 
lengths to hide or even remove their now hazardous marks.94 Some have argued that with 
their newfound lower visibility, the maras have been able to move to smaller 
communities and possibly even infiltrate national police and military units.95 
However, these adaptations have not kept them from meeting and continuing gang 
activity.96 The spread of wanton violence, not just by the gang members but also by the 
vigilante groups and rogue police officers, has fueled the insecurity and culture of 
impunity that the gangs have depended upon for recruitment and survival. 
The Central American response, both official and unofficial, also intensified the 
transnational nature of the gangs. While deportations from the United States continue to 
this day, and are in fact more prevalent than ever, the deportees are received differently. 
They are no longer the rock stars or idols to youth they were in the 90s.97 In fact they are 
actually in great danger upon arrival as police and vigilante groups target new arrivals for 
detention and murder. Many gang members say they would rather take their chances 
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security by attempting to sneak back into the 
United States rather than face groups like Sombra Negra98. This has led to more gang 
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members crossing borders to get into Mexico and for many, to eventually return to the 
U.S. This mobility, both voluntary and involuntary, has allowed the maras to prosper by 
engaging in drug smuggling and human trafficking, work that has added another 
dimension to their nature. 
When discerning the sophistication and transnational nature of these groups it is 
important to distinguish between international organized crime and youth or street gangs. 
Some believe that gangs like Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gang have already 
crossed the line into transnational organized crime.99 They note, for instance, some mara 
clique's involvement in drug smuggling and dealing and their role in human trafficking 
between Mexico and the U.S. However, this understanding is a bit over simplified and 
relies upon old models of understanding criminal networks and youth gangs. The 
essential point to understand is that while gangs like MS-13 operate in over six countries 
and thirty-three states, they are still intrinsically local entities. The vast majority of the 
members of any gang rarely if ever leave a few block radius from their gangs' territory. 100 
Los Angeles-style gangs are fiercely territorial and the vast majority of their time is spent 
within these bounds. The majority of income-receiving gangs like MS-13 depend upon 
local extortion rackets or local drug dealing and distribution for the majority of their 
funds. Undoubtedly, as immigration and deportation statistics demonstrated earlier, some 
gang members travel between countries, not always voluntarily, and these particular 
individuals may have a special status or role in their cliques. However, to this date, there 
have been no corroborated reports or evidence of any kind of centralized or even 
moderately hierarchical gang leadership structure in any Central American country, 
giving us even less reason to believe in the existence of a regional organization. lOI The 
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vast majority of gang members ostensibly belong only to their neighborhood cliques. 
While they may identify themselves or their gang as part of an international network, 
outside of a shared local culture, their connection with their international counterparts is 
basically non-existent. 102 
The truly organized international networks that run the profitable illegal drug 
trade and that dominate human trafficking are still organized crime cartels which run 
more like a business than a street gang. Such organizations include the Mexican mafia, 
(La Eme), and several Colombian drug cartels that operate regionally. If such criminal 
organizations had business operation flow charts, the role of MS-13 and M-18 cliques 
would be at the very bottom of the value-added process. Groups like La Eme hire gang 
members to do certain low level jobs, and may even contract local distribution out to a 
specific local clique ofMS-13 or M-18. The pandillas are most often used as 'soldiers,' 
drug dealers and mules, and while some enterprising gang leaders or cliques may carve a 
local niche for themselves, there is no evidence ofMS-13 cliques taking over leadership 
or strategic positions in the process nor obtaining any of the "means ofproduction" in the 
drug trade. 103 
One particular trait that has been applied to MS-13 and M-18 is their inclination 
to "migrate" and actively spread their gang culture or start new cliques. A common 
belief is that the expansion of these gangs, MS-13 in particular, to urban and even 
suburban areas across the U.S. is the result of planned or entrepreneurial expansion. 104 A 
more realistic explanation for such proliferation is that gangs go where their community 
goes. MS-13 cliques do not exist where there is no Central American immigrant 
population. The suburban and sometimes rural locations where the maras have been 
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emerging are not simply "chosen" because the local law enforcement lacks experience in 
dealing with gangs. Rather, new gang cliques appear only in areas with new Central 
American communities. lOS New immigrants commonly congregate where their family or 
former neighbors have migrated beforehand; this corresponds with the level of 
importance Latinos traditionally place on family and community networks. This 
community connection is also significant in that the primary victims of these gangs are 
members oftheir own community. Despite public denouncements in the media of 
"criminal illegal alien gangs" from Central America terrorizing our suburban 
communities,106 the majority of crimes committed by maras in the United States target 
their own community. 
An important distinction to keep in mind is the difference between transnational 
business or criminal contacts and family contacts. Transnational family connections 
between Latino immigrants are common and remittances from the U.S. to family back 
home are so common the regional economy depends upon them. Criminal contacts on 
the other hand are a different story. While rumors oftransnational profit sharing and 
strategic expansion persist, for the most part they lack any basis in fact on a systemic or 
organizational scale. Virtually all suspected cases or rumors of transnational 
collaboration without the aid of a third party (organized crime, e.g., fa Erne) have been 
proven inaccurate or at the very least embellished. 107 
The idea of street gangs evolving into organized crime-like enterprises is not 
exclusive to the Central American maras. The 1987 conviction of members of Chicago's 
EI Rukns gang on terrorism charges connected with Libya's Moammar Gadhafi is such 
an example. However, most of the evidence regarding the evolution of street gangs to 
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more sophisticated hybrid-organized crime networks is anecdotal and promoted by media 
coverage or high-profile prosecutors. 108 In reality, as gangs grow and expand they do not 
necessarily follow organizational theory which asserts that bureaucratic and hierarchical 
structure are natural consequences of expansion. Gangs are an anomaly; they are a 
fundamentally different type of organization apart from organized crime. Rather than 
being organized in a pyramid structure like most organized crime or other large groups, 
gangs have a more organic organization that is more adaptive and dispersed. 109 
One rumor in particular demonstrates the attitude and framework with which 
regional governments have interpreted the growth of the maras. A report from Honduras 
alleged that a suspected Al Qaeda operative, Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, was in 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras meeting with members ofMS-13, allegedly to procure assistance 
in smuggling Al Qaeda terrorist operatives and armaments across the border. I 10 The 
rumor was eventually proven false, but the idea was already planted and prompted more 
fears about u.s. border security and MS-13, which some still consider a terrorist­
associated organization. I II The willingness to believe in connections between terrorist 
groups like Al Qaeda and street gangs like MS-13 stems from the general framework 
with which these gangs are interpreted. Rather than being seen as a social problem (like 
most other gangs), they are treated as enemy combatants that need to be eliminated not 
rehabilitated. llz Because of the transnational similarities and connections (regardless of 
their nature) between the MS-13 and M-18 cliques they are conceptualized more as 
terrorist cells than as local franchises of a cultural phenomenon. It is within this context 
that the Mana Dura policies are implemented. The Central American governments do 
not see these gang members as their own children, which in a nationalistic sense they 
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generally are, but rather as separate almost inhuman, violent animals. This conceptual 
understanding of street gangs ignores the social aspects of their development and prompts 
governments to address gang threats much like an insurgency, or rather, with policies 
reminiscent of the civil wars. Vulnerable youth become trapped between structural 
poverty and social/familial breakdown on the one hand and brutally oppressive 
government policies that deny the rights and very humanity of their own citizens on the 
other, allowing for a seemingly endless cycle of violence. 
Gangs 2.0 
The propensity for change and adaptation that has allowed the maras to expand 
and evolve according to their circumstances and the challenges they confront is the very 
same process that is prevalent in all youth. The popularization and spread of Los Angeles 
gang culture as set of popularized images and ideas to be consumed by the masses started 
during the 1990s. In the past few years, new methods of creating cultural flows have 
opened up and become available to the general population. The shift has been called 
Web 2.0, 113 and it is based upon the internet's shift to more user-created and user-friendly 
web publishing applications. Examples include MySpace, YouTube, BitTorrent, Blogs, 
and Google AdSense. These innovations make the creation of content viewable to 
millions ofpeople worldwide possible for anyone with access to a computer and the 
internet. With Web 2.0, the internet is no longer the sole territory of elites with specific 
computer training or resources; instead, the internet is a platform upon which nearly 
anyone can publish content and transmit cultural and political messages. This change has 
taken the powers of cultural commodification and transmission out of the hands of the 
elites and has made them available to anyone. 
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In the context of Central American gangs, the shift towards a Web 2.0 dominated 
internet implies that the culture is now more available than ever, anywhere in the world, 
uncensored and unprocessed. Searches on MySpace and YouTube alone show hundreds 
if not thousands of references to Mara Salvatrucha and M_18. 114 This has created the 
notion of virtual gangs, or Gangs 2.0, whereby along the periphery of traditional street 
gangs, there is also an informal network ofweb-content creators. With varying levels of 
contact with real gang cliques these actors nonetheless spread the gang culture online. 
Now, there are countless chat rooms, videos, online music, written stories and pictures of 
boys and some men holding up the recognizable gang signs while staring menacingly or 
in threatening poses. That said, it is highly unlikely that the gang members who make the 
nightly news for their brutal crimes are the same ones who are changing their online 
profile status and uploading a new MySpace template. In terms of cultural flows, 
however, the "street credibility" or true gang status of the web author is irrelevant. What 
is significant is that the culture is being spread by regular people at all, and that hundreds 
of interpretations and depictions of it are available. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to predict what these technological and social changes will mean for 
the future of Central American gangs or how their culture will evolve. Parts of the 
culture may be picked up and adapted by other disenfranchised youth somewhere else in 
the world, just as the Latino gangs were pulled into the African-American Los Angeles 
gang scene. This process should not be interpreted as a mechanical shaping of behavior 
by communication forces or by the media, but it should be noted that transmitted images 
enhance the presence of cultural ideas and open up avenues of communication among 
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different people and cultures. The only constants involving the transmission ofgang 
culture so far have been change and violence. Within gang culture, there is a constant 
craving to be on the cutting edge. Whether it is by getting the most extreme facial 
tattoos, adapting new music styles or committing the most violent of crimes, change has 
been the one constant factor in street gang activity. As certain aspects of this particular 
gang culture get commoditized or transmitted whether by the mass-media or by a 
teenager using MySpace, more and more people will have access to these cultural images 
and ideas. Even if the new web authors do not actively participate in the lifestyle the 
cultures depict, more opportunities will arise for the gangs to adapt and evolve. This 
process will continue to accelerate as technology further compresses time and space and 
the movement of people and ideas flow faster and faster. 
The suppression-centric strategies for dealing with transnational street gangs have 
proven limited at best. The gangs are much too fluid and adaptable to be controlled by 
traditional forces of the state. Central American street gang activity simply transcends 
national borders, and any strategy that depends on the idea that borders are entirely 
defensible or that gang activity can be solved through domestic approaches alone, is 
bound to fail. A lack of imagination prevented the U.S. Congress from seeing the 
potential impact of sending hardened criminal deportees back to Central America where 
they found thousands ofwilling recruits, products of their impoverished environment 
who were eager to buy into the culture of gang-life. This is not to say that the problem 
was avoidable, for in all likelihood, the maras would have spread to Central America 
regardless ofU.S. policies, as immigrants in the U.S. returned home voluntarily, or as the 
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gang culture was transmitted by the media, and would have caught on by itself in the 
region. The forced deportations simply accelerated the process. 
Implementing a realistic and viable solution for gang violence is not impossible. 
In fact many experts and organizations have already laid out the framework for such 
plans. They focus on addressing gang violence as a social problem, and while law 
enforcement suppression is undoubtedly a necessary part to ensure short-term security, 
the roots of the problem must be addressed. There are several models upon which to base 
local or national policies that would be viable for Central American countries with the 
correct foreign assistance. I IS The main step however will be the acknowledgement that 
the spread of gang activity is a transnational problem that needs a regional solution with 
U.S. leadership and support. I16 All countries involved must acknowledge that by acting 
solely out of their own self interests, even in regards to particular domestic policies, they 
directly impact their neighbors, in this case provoking the cycle of gang violence across 
the region. I 17 
What makes the case of Central American gangs so interesting in the context of 
globalization and government policy is the paradoxical dual nature of Central American 
gangs. The Central American maras, like all gangs, are fundamentally local 
organizations. Their members are territory-focused and the income they generate 
normally comes from within the small geographical area they control. Unlike terrorists, 
they are products and members of the very community and society in which they live and 
operate. Any successful anti-gang initiative must, for these reasons, be hyper local, it 
must reach out to the local elementary and high schools, confront families, create 
economic opportunities in small communities and work with local community leaders 
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and organizations. On the other hand, as people and ideas flow faster than ever around 
the world, what appear to be the most local of policy changes can have a global effect. 
The anti-gang initiatives in Los Angeles that increased the penalties for many gang­
related crimes, along with later changes in U.S. immigration law made gang members 
eligible for deportation in the first place. The Mana Dura policies of Honduras and EI 
Salvador coupled with vigilante violence made the mid-1990s gangster-heaven that was 
Central America nearly inhospitable if you had tattoos or wore your pants down low. 
This changed local environment resulted in many more gang members working to 
smuggle themselves back into the United States through Mexico. In doing this many 
gang members became familiarized with the border regions making them valuable assets 
to organized crime for drug smuggling and human trafficking while reinforcing the 
current cyclical and transnational nature of Central American gangs. 
Further research will be necessary to develop a more complete understanding of 
how these global cultural flows occur and operate upon an increasingly globalized world. 
However, even by giving an incomplete illustration of these global flows within the 
narrative of the rise and evolution ofCentral American street gangs, this paper 
demonstrates the impact changing forces in globalization have on everyday life. This 
has significant policy implications as nation-state governments attempt to tackle evolving 
transnational problems such as immigration, the illicit drug trade, crime and terrorism. 
The intrinsic limitations of the nation-state, even one as powerful as the United States, in 
the face of the forces and flows of globalization make global cooperation a necessity in 
the 21 st century. 
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Appendix A. 
Two M-18 members in El Hoyon prison, Escuintla Guatemala. 
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